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personalities. Through these descriptions,
Tyerman creates after all a snapshot of
how the crucesignati and jihadi thought,
and in particular how they were influ-
enced by the concept of holy war.
Tyerman avoids the controversy of the
influence of the Crusades on events in
the Middle East today. He outlines the
Christian concept of just war and holy
war without assessing whether the Cru-
sades were just. He describes the Mus-
lim concept of jihad, yet does not pass
judgment on the initial conquest or
reconquest of the Hold Land by the
Arabs. Additionally, he does not ad-
dress Western guilt over the Crusades
or the Islamic feeling of having been
wronged. Only in passing does he men-
tion a certain pope’s apology and a cer-
tain politician’s ill-timed use of the
word “crusade.” In a word, he neither
condemns nor apologizes for the ac-
tions and violence of Christians or
Muslims but clearly lays out the social,
religious, political, and economic
causes and results of the Crusades.
For readers searching for a single-volume
survey of the crusading movement,
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In this insightful and elegantly written
set of essays in international history,
David Reynolds ruminates on the
causes, evolution, and consequences of
what came to be called the “special rela-
tionship” between the United States
and Great Britain during the Second
World War and thereafter through the
Cold War. Geostrategically, this rela-
tionship originated with the fall of
France in May 1940, which Reynolds
treats quite rightly as the “fulcrum of
the Twentieth Century.” Until then,
British leaders had counted on France
to contain Germany, with England
making only a limited commitment of
ground forces to the continent and rely-
ing on a powerful deterrent based on
strategic bombing. In 1940, with the
French knocked out of the war and
England’s small army in ruins, whether
the British could fight on against Ger-
many’s Wehrmacht depended above all
on support from the United States.
Winston Churchill’s decision to con-
tinue fighting turned out to be the right
policy chosen for the wrong reasons,
because Franklin D. Roosevelt was ini-
tially unwilling to supply more than
material aid and was later unable to
bring Americans into the war until both
Japan and Germany declared war on
the United States. Shared hatred of a vi-
cious enemy, a more or less common
language, generally similar liberal polit-
ical principles, shared intelligence,
combined military staffs, summitry,
and the industrial prowess of the
United States was to make the Anglo-
American alliance perhaps more effec-
tive than any other in history.
Year by year, however, British influence
within the Grand Alliance waned as
American power waxed. In the spirit of
Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt sought an
alternative to traditional alliances in his
vision of postwar international peace
and security cooperation by means of
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the “Four Policemen”—the United
States, the United Kingdom, China, and
the Soviet Union—each of which would
earn a permanent seat at the United
Nations Security Council. Despite
Roosevelt’s hopes of extending wartime
cooperation with the Soviet Union into
the peace, the ever more closed systems
of government established within Soviet-
occupied East-Central Europe increas-
ingly induced both British and American
leaders to begin to fear the USSR as the
Second Coming of the Third Reich.
This shared perception, fueled (some-
what unintentionally, Reynolds claims)
by Churchill’s “iron curtain” speech in
Fulton, Missouri, in 1946, brought the
two wartime allies ever closer together
again. Fears that appeasement would
merely whet the aggressor’s appetite for
more then sustained the growing trans-
atlantic consensus that the Soviet Union
needed to be contained.
As the Cold War heated up, the British
and the rest of Western Europe needed
American power; Americans needed
British bases around the world, as well
as the legitimacy and self-assurance that
the support of this ally, especially,
might supply both at home and abroad.
Although the Pax Britannica collapsed
in the eastern Mediterranean in 1947, it
was replaced rapidly and smoothly by
the Pax Americana, as exemplified in the
Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan,
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation, with the especially close rela-
tionship between Britain and the
United States serving as the foundation
of transatlantic unity and cooperation.
Henceforward, England would play
Robin to America’s Batman, gambling
that loyalty to the United States would
enable it to punch above its weight.
Loyalty would purchase Britain a dis-
proportionate influence in American
foreign policy, though some in England
might occasionally wonder whether the
price in national honor was too high,
especially when prime ministers ap-
peared to be mere “poodles” serving
American masters.
Reynolds does not romanticize the spe-
cial relationship. The Suez crisis of 1956
made it clear that Americans would not
prop up declining empires; indeed, it
was American policy to hurry them into
their graves. Nonetheless, Americans
were there when the British needed
them, with satellite intelligence and
other support, in the Falklands War.
However, the Iraq war of 2003 suggests
that sometimes Robin might be too
loyal to the caped crusader, who needs
to look before he leaps and benefit from
wiser counsel from his most loyal ally.
For all these difficulties, Reynolds
shows that the current international or-
der rests on common Anglo-American
liberal principles and overlapping polit-
ical cultures that shaped how both the
British and the Americans defined their
interests from World War II to the end
of the Cold War and beyond. Though
the relationship may always have been
more special to the British than the
Americans, Reynolds shows why it
needs to continue to be especially close.
Arguably far more than Roosevelt’s
United Nations, Churchill’s union of
English-speaking peoples saved civiliza-
tion from barbarism again and again in
the twentieth century. Our prospects in
the current century require us to keep
that union especially in mind.
KARL WALLING
Naval War College
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